Other claims of conscience 6 are not so predictable. For example, doctors might object to particular instances which are not necessarily covered by (predictable) generalizable rules.
These cases may involve practices which the doctor does not usually object to but does so in this instance on these facts. This may well occur in end-of-life cases where doctors have provided a particular treatment, or set of treatments, and then decide that they have reached a 'bridge too far', so that that treatment previously provided has now become objectionable.
Since these claims involve individualised fact scenarios and practices which are often not objectionable in themselves, it may not be possible to predict when they will arise in advance. 6 Conscience-based claims are often referred to either as conscience-based exemptions or conscientious objections. In order to differentiate between the types of conscience claims I am concerned with here from the generally discussed types, the individualised ones I am discussing will be referred to as claims of conscience with all others called conscientious objections.
the time period in question. This, therefore, was different from a case where a doctor objects to the provision of RRT in all instances. They instead argued that they could not provide these treatments in this particular case under these particular facts. None of the treatments were morally objectionable in general, but they were here and, as a consequence, the doctors argued that they should not be forced to provide them.
The case was not decided by any reference to conscience. Neither party appears to have mentioned claims of conscience, nor did the judges rely on them in making their decisions.
Instead, they relied on the standard 'best interests' analysis. 13 Nevertheless I argue that doing so disguised rather than illuminated the important issues in the case. The main issue to be decided was not the best interests of David James but the extent to which the doctors should have been required to provide treatment they objected to. A more direct analysis of claims of conscience would have provided a more accurate resolution to the case at hand. To do this, however, would require that courts have a better understanding of how to address claims of conscience like the one in James. They do not currently have any effective method for doing so, and thus rely on distorted analysis under the best interests test. My purpose here is to provide a means of analysis that courts could use in these types of case. In order to do this, some preliminary work must be done on what we mean when we discuss conscience, before developing a conceptual model for exploring these kinds of conscience claims. I will then return to a discussion of James in order to test the usefulness of this conceptual model.
Finally, I will explore the model's normative implications.
II. Concept of conscience
Before attempting to create a conceptual model of claims of conscience in medical treatment, we need an understanding what conscience is. We often talk about doing something 'in good conscience', 14 or we might refer to being able to do something with a 'clear conscience'.
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What do we normally mean when we talk about conscience in these sorts of ways?
Conscience involves reasons which are both moral (at least partially) 16 as well as intentional.
They must also be inward-facing. Conscience claims are about my moral choices and
decisions, not what I necessarily think others are required to do. 17 More specifically, conscience, in the way we generally use it, is a feeling, attitude, or belief, which is frequently but not necessarily based upon religion, about whether doing something is right or wrong. 18 Feelings, beliefs, or emotions can provide reasons for action, 19 and conscience is no different in that regard. 20 It provides an impetus for acting in a certain way, but that does not necessarily require any complex thought pattern or rationale. Instead, we often use conscience as a 'moral nose.' 21 Because of conscience, we shy away from various actions or activities and are drawn towards others, but it may not be especially clear why this is the case. Conscience also does not have to be correct. 22 Considering this intolerable, she asked for the ventilator to be withdrawn. 33 Her doctors and health care team refused, primarily on the basis that they liked her and did not want to see her die. 34 The hospital argued that they should not be made to remove the ventilator from Ms B because she was not making a truly informed choice since she had not attempted the suggested weaning process.
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They, therefore, presented a technical argument, but the doctors' concern was apparently that they could not in good conscience withdraw the ventilator from her. 36 Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss P, in deciding the case, focused on whether Ms B has the capacity to make a decision. Since all of the evidence presented to the court was that she had capacity, Dame doctors about their own conduct, but on a way to assess whether a particular treatment is best for the patient. James provides an example of this in practice. The objection of the doctors was not that the treatment, including RRT, would not work, but that to administer it was something they could not reasonably be asked to do to a patient. 43 In the Court of Appeal this objection was used by the court to conclude that the treatment would not be in David's best interests, despite admitting that he was happy and would probably want to continue to live. 44 The Court used the objection of the medical team to the proposed treatment to determine what constituted best interests. However, this approach was not supported by Lady Hale in the Supreme Court. She instead stated that in identifying best interests it was necessary to focus on the individual patient. 45 Both the Court of Appeal and the Supreme
Court thus focused their attention on David's best interests instead of conscience.
Even so, there is evidence that claims of conscience played at least some part in the doctors' views about the case. First, there is considerable focus on the painful, discomforting, and distressing nature of the treatment, particularly in relation to RRT. It also plays a role in the doctors' views about the other treatments that David might receive. In the case of RRT, Dr G referred to the shivering effect of the blood-thinning medication as the thing he is 'personally really concerned about'. 46 This concern is separated from the clinical concerns about RRT which Dr G expressed as the possibility of bleeding or strokes. These are hardly minor concerns; nevertheless, shivering was Dr G's primary concern specifically the 'distress' and 'very unpleasant experience' it would cause. 47 This focus on the distressing rather than medical effects of the treatment suggests that Dr G's primary concern was more moral than 43 James (n 9) [22] clinical.
Moreover, the doctors repeatedly stated that they held this opinion despite the evidence of potential benefits to David, benefits they did not dispute. 48 Additionally, neither the doctors nor the Court of Appeal argued that David would not have wanted treatment to continue had he been able to decide for himself. 49 They also did not dispute the fact that he seemed to get significant benefit from the presence of his family and friends or the other interests that he had. Similarly, they did not dispute that David's family wished him to continue to receive treatment, at least partially on the basis that they believed it corresponded with his most likely Neither of these two facts, individually or together, provides enough evidence to argue that claims of conscience were clearly at play in the James decision. Instead, they highlight that 48 This is not specifically stated in the sections replicated in the Court of Appeal judgment. However, the doctors talked about the treatment options as being 'distressing', 'discomforting' or 'painful', ibid [22] None of this means that judges do not consider the doctor's conscience in cases which come before the court, it just means that these claims of conscience are often hidden by other legal concepts or rules. If a judge uses conscience to decide a particular case, they may talk instead of different legal rules such as best interests to justify the decision, as they did in
James.
51 This is problematic because these claims of conscience are then not subject to any analysis by the judges. Neither Ward LJ nor Arden LJ, for example, provided any meaningful analysis of the claims of conscience by the doctors in James. There was no attempt to examine whether these claims of conscience were true; that is, that the doctor actually had the particular claims of conscience in question, nor to consider the effect of such a claim. This does not necessarily provide protection for either patients or doctors, because these claims of conscience are not subject to any scrutiny, and even if a doctor has a legitimate claim of conscience, there is no guarantee that it will be considered in any meaningful way by the courts. As a consequence, a legitimate claim of conscience may not be approved even in cases where it might be appropriate to do so. the purposes of this model, we will consider a judicial decision-maker although there is no specific reason why one ought to be required. This is merely because such cases are likely to end up in the courts for resolution if they cannot be decided by less formal means. It, therefore, seems preferable to consider a model which could be used by judges in the determination of these sorts of cases.
Since these sorts of cases are individualised and based upon a specific set of facts, it is first necessary to outline those facts for analysis. This is likely to involve a relatively detailed history, diagnosis and prognosis of the patient. The judge, like the doctor making the claim, will need to have a solid understanding of what has led to the current situation as well as how that situation might be different from previous points in time in the treatment of the patient.
In addition to the clinical understanding of the condition, it will be necessary for the purposes of evaluation to have an understanding of what the patient wants. This will depend on whether the patient has capacity. If she does, then further questions arise as to whether they have been provided with sufficient information to be able to make an informed choice, and whether they have made that choice independently of controlling influences. If the patient has capacity, has received sufficient information and made the choice free from controlling influences, then the decision made by the patient is autonomous, 66 and thus worthy of respect, even if that decision is neither rational or wise.
If the patient lacks the capacity to make an autonomous decision, then the analysis turns to her best interests. But the lack of an autonomous decision does not mean that the analysis automatically moves to best interests. If, for example, a patient has not made an autonomous decision because of a lack of information, then the issue is how best to inform the patient so that they could make one. 67 The best interests test is only appropriate if the patient is incapable of making an autonomous decision, an issue which would be based on their capacity under the MCA. As Lady Hale indicated in James, the best interests test is not an objective one, 68 and, therefore, not based on some hypothetical idea about a reasonable patient. Instead, the patient's own interests, wishes and desires are the touchstone. The claim of conscience itself should be subject to evaluation. This will require, first, that the doctor is able to articulate the claim as a conscience-based one, as opposed to some other type of claim. 71 Is this something which is against the conscience of the doctor to provide?
It is also necessary for it to be an actual claim rather than a plausible claim. The claim of conscience must be based on what the doctor actually believes, not what she might have believed. Furthermore, the doctor must be able to articulate reasons as to why they have this particular belief. This does not require a substantial, thought-out coherent set of beliefs based upon a comprehensive ethical or religious view. Instead, the doctor must be able to articulate why it is that the treatment in this case is subject to a claim of conscience. What is it about this case and these circumstances that means the doctor is unable to provide the requested treatment? What differentiates this case from other cases where the doctor has provided the treatment, or would do so? The doctor is not required to articulate a firm set of beliefs in the way Meyers and Woods suggest, but they must be able to provide some reason which explains why this case is different from other cases. These cannot be any reasons but must be limited to the treatment in question and its effect upon the patient. And it is not acceptable for a doctor to object to provide treatment for a patient for a reason which would otherwise count as discriminatory. For example, a doctor could not object to providing treatment to a patient merely because it would leave a patient physically disabled. 
V. A Test Case
We can test this model using James as an example, and then explain where the real fault lines in the case lie, and what role conscience played in the case. Under the model, we start with information about the patient's condition, history, and prognosis. From the evidence available in the decisions, David was in significant decline which seemed to require ever increasing levels of treatment. We know that he was a permanent fixture in the Intensive Care Unit of the hospital, and there was little to no chance that he would leave it. The treatments included RRT, CPR, and 'invasive support for circulatory problems'. 72 These are significant treatments with associated problems, including, at least as far as RRT was concerned, the likelihood of 24-hour care which would make David shiveringly cold. According to Lady Hale, it did not matter whether the proposed treatment could return him to a life of significant function, or whether he would ever be able to return home.
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What mattered was what he would have considered best under the circumstances, and the trial judge was justified in saying that meant that treatment ought to continue.
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The remaining issues surround the doctor's claims of conscience. As noted in Section III above, there was evidence to believe that the doctors' objections to continuing to treat David relied, at least in part, on matters of conscience. They were concerned about the distress, pain, and discomfort that he would experience if the treatment had to be provided. More importantly, their objections were framed in terms of what they thought they ought to provide to him, rather than what he would have wanted to receive. The doctors expressed the view that, even if David had capacity and requested the treatment at issue, they still would have refused to provide it. Moreover, since they did not dispute the family's claim that David would have wanted to continue treatment and that it provided important benefits to him, the doctors' concern involved a belief about what they could be asked to provide and not what was necessarily 'best' for David. We can, therefore, presume, under the model, that the doctors did have claims of conscience in the case.
It then becomes necessary to determine whether the doctors could have provided a set of reasons to explain why this particular claim of conscience ought to be accepted. Considering the importance of non-maleficence as a bioethical principle, 78 in addition to the fact that RRT does not normally continue as long as they thought it might have to in this case, 79 there is evidence that the position of the doctors was based upon acceptable reasons. Treating a patient who is shiveringly cold because of something you have done must be troubling, especially if there is nothing the doctors can do to alleviate the situation. They would have been required to treat David continuously despite the difficulties they were causing him, which means the treatment would be significantly harder for the doctors to accept providing.
Providing a bad side effect for a limited time for treatment which will ultimately provide a benefit is one thing, doing so for a considerably longer period of time without an ultimate goal is another. This would be ethically problematic, and there is, therefore, no reason to believe that the doctors' claims of conscience in the case were anything other than based upon these reasons. There is no evidence in the case, for example, that there was any 78 Beauchamp and Childress (n 29)150-201. 79 James (n 9) [23]per Ward LJ. discriminatory basis for their reasons for not providing the treatment.
The effects of this claim of conscience, however, are substantial for David. The reason these treatments were at issue is because they were the only ones thought to have a prospect of improving his condition. Otherwise, the doctors appear to have been limited to more palliative options. This is why the family objected so strongly to not providing the treatment, 
VI. Benefits of the new model
From this example we can see that my model accurately reflects the issues involved in ethically troubling cases, and identifies the relevant questions. These are important aspects of a conceptual model for ethically difficult cases which includes claims of conscience, but they are not the only benefits which might accrue from using such a model. The model is beneficial to the doctor because it recognises the importance of the doctor's autonomy in medical law. As noted above, if we truly wish to respect autonomy we need to respect the autonomy of all of the parties involved in medical cases. 81 This includes, at a minimum, the autonomy of the doctor as well as that of the patient. My model accomplishes this by providing a justification for doctors to make honest claims of conscience. Doctors can make these claims directly as opposed to having to hide them behind other principles. There is no need for a doctor to force a claim of conscience into a connection with the patient's best interests, as they appear to have done in James. This ability to make direct claims of conscience will allow doctors to assert an autonomy interest in the actions that they perform.
It will help to separate these autonomy claims from the best interests and welfare concerns that doctors might have about the patient, as I have shown in Section V above.
In addition, this model of decision-making exposes the conscience of doctors to more regular scrutiny. Since the claim of conscience is not hidden behind other principles, judges can more effectively examine whether those claims are reasonable because they can be addressed directly. Judges will then be less likely to be misled that a claim of conscience is something else, and can analyse these claims more appropriately. A claim of conscience is different to a claim about the patient's best interests and should be evaluated on different grounds.
Allowing a general space for these claims to be made provides a mechanism which allows for that evaluation. Additionally, if claims of conscience become a more regular part of these sorts of cases, judges will be better able to determine when one exists, even if it is hidden behind other values. The more experience the court has with evaluating claims of conscience, the more likely the court is to recognise these claims and act accordingly.
We can see this through an examination of what could have happened in Ms. B if claims of conscience had been a regular aspect of the analysis. As stated in Section III above, the doctors did not want to remove the ventilator from Ms B because they did not think that it was the right thing to do. However, without further analysis, that particular claim is unclear.
We do not have an understanding about why the doctors thought the removal of artificial ventilation was unacceptable. We can speculate about two possible answers. First, the doctors were worried about causing the death of Ms B. Alternatively, they were concerned primarily with a potential violation of the law. The first possibility is one that the court is likely to consider reasonable, the second is not because the court has informed doctors that these actions do not violate the law. 82 More importantly, being able to subject these claims of conscience to scrutiny provides the court with an effective way to regulate the doctor's behaviour. If the claim was the first one, then a judge's best response is probably to do what Dame Butler-Sloss did in the actual case, move the patient to a doctor willing to perform the specified action. If it is the second, then a more effective answer would have been to reemphasise to the doctors that removing the ventilator was not a crime. But it is only when these claims of conscience receive proper scrutiny that these answers become clear.
A new model of medical decision-making, which allows space to consider a doctor's claim of conscience, would also result in returning the concept of best interests to a focus on the patient and her interests. At the moment, best interests includes a hidden element of the doctor's conscience, as an action is considered to be in the best interests of the patient only if the doctor is willing to do it. This is especially true in the cases that we have been The James decision again provides a good example of this benefit. As noted in Section IV, Another benefit of this new model is that is allows for conscience-based claims which are not based upon predictive, generalizable rules. While this has been the dominant model for conscientious objections, not all conscience-based claims take this form. Many are objections to specific instances of a practice which the doctor might generally agree with.
The reasons why a particular case might be objectionable could also rely on a number of individual factors which make it difficult to predict them in advance or provide a coherent set of rules which would apply in all situations. A decision-making model such as this, which provides a way to analyse individual claims of conscience, offers a way to explore these types of claims without requiring an individual to fit into a classification which might not be accurate. A final benefit is that it provides a way to fully explore issues that arise between individual doctors and the profession. Doctors do not need to necessarily agree with the view of the profession as a whole. Actions which they think inappropriate may be accepted by the profession and vice-versa. Conscience provides a way to evaluate these differences and the model provides a mechanism to do that. Since claims of conscience are evaluated by an objective third party, the court, it becomes possible to explore situations where an individual doctor differs from the rest of the profession. Montgomery is an indication.
VII. Problems with the new decision-making model
Even if the new model does not provide greater power to doctors, we may wish to avoid it on the ground that it lessens the power of patients. As a result, patients might be considered to have less right to make autonomous decisions than they do now. That concern, though, overestimates the power that patients currently have. As case law makes clear, patients do not have a right to require that doctors provide particular treatment. 85 All they have is a right to request that treatment. 86 If the requested procedure would not fulfil the duty that the doctor has to the patient -if it is not considered proper medical treatment -then there is no requirement that a doctor provide it, even if the patient sincerely desires it. 87 Thus, the new model would not take away from patients something that they currently have. Moreover, there is the possibility it will provide an additional benefit to patients because it will allow them to contest these claims of conscience to determine whether they are reasonable. At the moment doctors, by hiding claims of conscience behind other values, prevent patients from contesting and evaluating those claims. Pushing them out into the open will allow them to be analysed and explored just like the other claims involved in medical cases benefitting patients and providing them with additional resources in medical decision-making.
The final potential problem is not about the power of either doctors or patients but of the courts. If we use this new model of decision-making to explore decisions in ethically difficult medical cases, the final authority for the decision will rest with the courts. It will, therefore, ultimately be out of the hands of both doctors and patients. come to these cases with their own biases and prejudices which might influence their decisions. For example, a judge may have a particular view about treatment at the end of life which influences the way she views the claim of conscience by a doctor in a case involving that treatment. If that view is no more advanced than that of the patient or the doctor, there is no reason why it should prevail, especially since the judge will not have to face the consequences of that decision. Furthermore, there is the additional problem raised by
Montgomery that the legalisation of medicine has resulted in the de-moralisation of medicine.
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Claims which were initially based on moral ideas become legalistic and substantive moral claims are consequently lost in the discussion. He is also sceptical of the distinction between medical and moral decisions, and argues in favour of the creation of a 'legitimate common moral community' which accepts that medical and moral decisionmaking are interlinked and not separate.
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While I share Montgomery's concerns about the de-moralisation of medicine and am sympathetic to the creation of a 'legitimate common moral community', I am probably more cynical about the ability of doctors to effectively do so without significant oversight. Unless and until medical education changes to put an increasing emphasis on medical ethics, the training doctors receive on that front can be largely haphazard. Indeed, Montgomery notes that most medical ethics training happens 'from their experience of practice'. 90 The real life application of ethics is to be respected, but ethical training also requires reflection, discussion, and interaction with others about the moral principles which underlie a decision.
Not all of these might be present in the sorts of practice experiences Montgomery notes. As a consequence, there is a need for oversight of the ethical decisions that doctors make. Judges 88 Montgomery (n 27). 89 Ibid. IV not only allows for a direct analysis of claims of conscience by doctors in these sorts of cases but does so in a way which protects the interests of patients. Courts would be better suited if they examined cases like James using such a model than the method currently employed because it provides a clear explanation of the actual problem in these sorts of cases. This is not only better from an analytical perspective but might also provide a way for doctors and patients to discuss more openly and honestly how conscience affects the difficult and often terrible choices that must be made at the end of life.
